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INTRODUCTION 
he United States Court of International Trade has exclu-
sive nationwide jurisdiction to review United States Cus-
toms and Border Protection (“Customs”) decisions concerning 
the tariff classification of imported merchandise.1 Tariff classi-
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fication is important to both the United States and to importers 
because it controls, among other things, the rate of duty appli-
cable to goods entering the United States. Importers may chal-
lenge the classification that Customs assigns to merchandise in 
an effort to seek the refund of duties,2 to avoid the imposition of 
monetary penalties for noncompliance,3 to avoid the application 
of quantitative quotas, or for other reasons. 
Most tariff classification cases do not involve disputed facts 
concerning the structure, operation, or other physical aspects of 
the merchandise. Consequently, these cases often turn entirely 
on questions of law involving the interpretation of the Harmo-
nized Tariff Schedule of the United States.4 Consistent with 
the legal nature of these disputes, most classification cases are 
resolved via motions for summary judgment because there are 
no material facts in dispute.5 
Nevertheless, the parties to classification disputes generally 
engage in sometimes lengthy and expensive discovery involving 
document production and deposition testimony from both lay 
and expert witnesses. The focus of this discovery is often to con-
firm, on the record, the nature of the merchandise in a way 
that fits each party’s understanding of the tariff language. Dis-
covery may also involve expert opinion as to the common and 
commercial meaning of the tariff language.6 Each party then 
argues for the Court of International Trade to adopt its inter-
pretation of the tariff language and then to apply the usually 
uncontroverted facts to the interpreted text. 
The result is that customs practitioners—both private and 
governmental—may expend considerable time and effort devel-
oping facts to fit a legal interpretation of the law that the court 
                                                                                                             
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012). 
 2. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2012). 
 3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2012). 
 4. See Levi Strauss Co. v. United States, 21 C.I.T. 677, 679 (1997) (“[T]he 
purely legal question found in most classification cases has already been an-
swered.”) rev’d on other grounds, 222 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 5. A review of decisions of the Court of International Trade showed that 
from January 1, 2011 through April 8, 2014, there were forty-five published 
opinions on tariff classification. Of those, only six referred to a trial. The re-
mainder were motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss. That 
means that only about 13% of classification cases involve a dispute regarding 
facts. 
 6. See, e.g., Samsung International, Inc. v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 
1330, 1342 (2012). 
2014] TARIFF CLASSIFICATION LITIGATION 957 
will not ultimately accept. For one party or the other, that will 
be wasted effort. 
This Article proposes that practitioners adopt an alternative 
approach modeled on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the 
patent case Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.7 Following 
a Markman model, practitioners would ask the Court of Inter-
national Trade to hold a hearing or entertain motions, prefera-
bly early in the dispute, to determine the scope of the tariff 
headings at issue. With that information, the parties would be 
able to devise a discovery plan that, given the court’s guidance 
as to the controlling law, focuses on any relevant questions of 
fact that may be necessary to resolve. It is suggested that prac-
titioners adopting this approach may find a quicker and more 
efficient resolution of customs classification disputes. Given the 
expense of customs litigation, this approach may also encour-
age more cases to be brought to the Court of International 
Trade, which would result in greater business and legal cer-
tainty in the application of the tariff laws. As an alternative, 
absent adoption by practitioners, the court might choose to 
adopt rules modeled on local patent rules in district courts in 
order to force the early resolution of questions of law. 
I. MARKMAN HEARINGS 
Markman was a patent infringement dispute relating to a 
system for tracking clothing and other articles brought into dry 
cleaning shops.8 The specific question brought to the Supreme 
Court was whether the correct interpretation of patent claims 
was a question of law to be decided by the court or a question of 
fact to be decided by a jury. 
As background, a patent must describe the scope of the 
claimed invention.9 In American patent law, the scope of the 
patent is defined by two elements. The first is the specification, 
which is a clear and concise description of the invention.10 The 
specification must provide enough detail to permit someone 
skilled in the relevant art (i.e., the relevant area of technology 
or industry) to implement the invention.11 The second part is 
                                                                                                             
 7. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 373. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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made up of the patent claims, which “distinctly claim” the sub-
ject matter the patent applicant regards as the invention.12 Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Markman, the claim defines 
the scope of the patent. Assuming the application matures into 
a granted patent, infringement results when the patent claim 
covers the infringer’s product or process.13 
Thus, like tariff language, the patent claim sets the metes 
and bounds of the subject merchandise. The claims define the 
scope of the patented invention in much the same way that a 
tariff heading defines the scope of the merchandise it covers. 
And, also like tariff language, the interpretation of the patent 
claim is purely a question of law. 
The fundamental question before the Supreme Court in 
Markman was whether claims interpretation is a question for 
the judge or for the jury. In tariff litigation, the question of 
what issues go to a jury is not relevant because actions chal-
lenging tariff classification determinations may not be tried 
before a jury.14 Nevertheless, in language strikingly similar to 
language used in myriad tariff classification cases from the 
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit,15 the Supreme Court characterized a patent 
case as consisting of two elements. “The first is a question of 
law, to be determined by the court, construing the letters-
patent, and the description of the invention and specification of 
claim annexed to them. The second is a question of fact, to be 
submitted to a jury.”16 In the end, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the interpretation and construction of patent claims 
is the province of judges. According to Justice Souter: 
The construction of written instruments is one of those things 
that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors 
unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent construction in 
                                                                                                             
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 13. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373. 
 14. Rule 38 of the Rules of the Court of International Trade (“C.I.T.”) pre-
serves the right to a jury trial in cases where that right is conferred by the 
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In other cases, including clas-
sification cases, an “advisory jury” is possible. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 39(c) 
(2010). 
 15. See, e.g., Faus Group Inc., v. United States, 581 F.3d 1369, 1371-72 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 189 F.3d 1346, 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 16. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384. 
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particular “is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, 
special training and practice. The judge, from his training and 
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to 
such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely 
to be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be ex-
pected to be.”17 
As a result of this finding, a practice has developed in which 
district court judges hold so-called Markman hearings. By way 
of example, consider the Local Patent Rules of the Northern 
District of Illinois.18 These rules require patent litigants to ex-
change lists of phrases the court should construe, the proposed 
construction of those terms, and, among other things, the ele-
ments of the subject merchandise or process that relate to the 
terms.19 Within seven days of this exchange, the parties must 
agree on up to ten claims to be submitted to the court.20 
After the list of claims for construction has been submitted, 
the party opposing infringement is given thirty-five days to 
submit briefs supporting their respective constructions of the 
claims.21 The brief may contain extrinsic and intrinsic evidence 
in support of the proposed constructions. Furthermore, the par-
ties may rely on testimony in a sworn statement. The rules 
then provide for response and reply briefs concerning claim 
construction and a joint appendix of supporting evidence. Fi-
nally, within twenty-eight days of the submission of the last 
brief, the judge may hold an oral argument or hearing on the 
proper construction of the tariff terms.22 
Using this process, the district court ensures that the ques-
tions of law arising out of claims construction are addressed by 
the court. The process, however, also has the potential to allow 
the court, through early intervention on questions of law, to 
narrow the issues to be addressed in discovery and subsequent 
proceedings. As a result, early claims construction may lead to 
settlement or the entry of summary judgment, which is explic-
itly recognized by the Northern District of Illinois in its com-
ments to Local Patent Rule 4.1. According to that Comment: 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. at 388-89 (citation omitted). 
 18. N.D. Ill. Local Patent Rules [hereinafter LPR]. 
 19. Id. at 4.1(a). 
 20. Id. at 4.1(b). 
 21. Id. at 4.2(a). 
 22. Id. at 4.3. 
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In some cases, the parties may dispute the construction of 
more than ten terms. But because construction of outcome-
determinative or otherwise significant claim terms may lead 
to settlement or entry of summary judgment, in the majority of 
cases the need to construe other claim terms of lesser im-
portance may be obviated. The limitation to ten claim terms 
to be presented for construction is intended to require the par-
ties to focus upon outcome-determinative or otherwise signifi-
cant disputes.23 
II. TARIFF CLASSIFICATION 
When merchandise is imported to the United States, the im-
porter is required to identify the nature of the merchandise by 
providing an eight-digit tariff classification number under the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.24 Customs 
uses this information, in part, to assess duties on the importa-
tion. Because of the tariff classification’s importance to the ad-
ministration of the customs laws, importers are required to ex-
ercise “reasonable care” when reporting classifications, as well 
as other information, to Customs.25 When Customs finally de-
termines the classification of the goods and otherwise com-
pletes its processing of the importation, it “liquidates the en-
try.”26 Liquidation is the final determination of the duties owed 
with respect to that entry of merchandise.27 
The Harmonized System (“HS”) for tariff classification was 
developed by the Customs Cooperation Council —now known 
as the World Customs Organization. The United States imple-
mented the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
                                                                                                             
 23. N.D. Ill. LPR 4.1. cmt. (emphasis added). 
 24. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1)(B) (2012). Two additional digits are appended to 
the tariff item for use by the Bureau of Census and do not affect the rate of 
duty applicable to the imported merchandise. See, e.g., Figure 1, infra, illus-
trating the eight-digit heading/subheading combination and the two-digit 
statistical suffix. 
 25. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (2012). “Reasonable care,” in this context, has 
been defined as the absence of negligence. United States v. Optrex America, 
Inc., 30 C.I.T. 650, 661 (2006). More specifically, customs negligence occurs 
when an importer fails “to exercise the degree of reasonable care and compe-
tence expected from a person in the same circumstances . . . “ See 19 C.F.R. 
Pt. 171 app. B(C)(1) (2012). 
 26. 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (2012). 
 27. Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 568 F.3d 1360, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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(“HTSUS”) in 1989 pursuant to the Convention on the Harmo-
nized System.28 
Internationally, the HS is broken down into twenty-one sec-
tions and ninety-seven chapters describing, in varying degrees 
of detail, all physical merchandise that might be imported into 
the United States. There are additional U.S.-specific provisions 
providing for special rates of duties, quotas, and other special 
treatment. 
As is illustrated in Figure 1, each chapter of the HTSUS is 
broken down into four-digit headings, which are the main op-
erational units of the classification system. In this example, 
Heading 9205 covers “Wind musical instruments (for example 
keyboard pipe organs, accordions, clarinets, trumpets, bag-
pipes) other than fairground organs and mechanical street or-
gans.” Headings are further broken down into six-digit sub-
headings and eight-digit tariff items (e.g., brass-wind instru-
ments of 9205.10.00 and bagpipes of 9205.90.20). The applica-
ble rate of duty is identified in column 1 under the heading 
“General.” For example, brass instruments are subject to a 
2.9% rate of duty while bagpipes are duty free. The “Special” 
rate of duty identifies applicable duty preference programs 
such as NAFTA (“CA” or “MX”), Chile (“CL”), and the General-
ized System of Preferences (“A”). 
Importers, government officials, and courts seeking to inter-
pret the HTSUS apply the included General Rules of Interpre-
tation, shown in Figure 2. These rules, and the binding section 
and chapter notes, are designed to differentiate between multi-
ple headings that might otherwise appear to describe the same 
merchandise. The Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized Sys-
tem, which are published by the World Customs Organization, 
provide commentary on the scope of the various components of 
the Harmonized System, but are not binding on Customs or the 
courts.29 Prior decisions of the Court of International Trade and 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are also useful 
tools for interpreting the tariff schedule. Lastly, Customs and 
Border Protection publishes private letter rulings to import-
                                                                                                             
 28. See 19 U.S.C. § 3011(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
 29. Although not binding, the Explanatory Notes are considered persuasive 
and generally indicative of the meaning of a tariff term. LeMans Corp. v. 
United States, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1380 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010), aff’d, 660 
F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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ers.30 The rulings illustrate the agency’s understanding of the 
relevant tariff language. 
  
                                                                                                             
 30. The rulings are published by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
online. See CROSS Customs Rulings Online Search System, U.S. CUSTOMS 
AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://rulings.cbp.gov (last visited April 5, 2014). 
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
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III. TARIFF LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The U.S. Court of International Trade is an Article III court31 
and has exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to tariff classi-
fication determinations by Customs.32 In most cases, the im-
porter challenges the determination via an administrative pro-
test.33 Customs decides the protest internally and, if denied, 
the protesting party may file a summons in the Court of Inter-
national Trade.34 
In contrast to most forms of administrative review in U.S. 
courts, tariff classification cases are reviewed de novo.35 The 
judge is statutorily directed to decide the case upon the record 
developed in the judicial proceeding. The parties engage in dis-
covery including the exchange of interrogatories and deposi-
tions to prepare for a trial on the merits.36 As stated above, 
there are few disputes as to the nature of the imported mer-
chandise and questions of fact are often absent or limited. As a 
result, these cases are most often decided on the basis of cross 
motions for summary judgment without the need for a trial. 
Like a district court in a patent case, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade applies a two part analysis to decide a classifica-
tion case. In the first part, the court determines the proper 
meaning of the relevant tariff terms.37 This is purely a question 
of law. In the second part, the court determines whether the 
merchandise at issue falls within a particular tariff provision.38 
The court is then charged with applying the law to the availa-
ble facts to arrive at a correct tariff classification, even if the 
correct result is not one proposed by one of the parties.39 Ap-
peals from the Court of International Trade go to the Court of 
                                                                                                             
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012). 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012). 
 33. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012); see also 19 C.F.R. § 174.11(b)(2). 
 34. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 174.21, 174.29 (2012). In classification cases, the 
summons is the initial pleading in the action. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 442 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2012). Tyco Fire Prods. L.P. v. United 
States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). 
 36. See 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 26 (2012). 
 37. Faus Group, 581 F.3d at 1371-72; Orlando Food Corp v. United States, 
140 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g 
denied, 739 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit40 and then ultimately—but 
rarely—to the Supreme Court. It is important to this discussion 
that the Federal Circuit is also the sole Court of Appeals for 
patent cases appealed from the regional district courts.41 
When construing the tariff language as a matter of law, the 
court is to determine the “common and commercial meaning” of 
the tariff terms.42 Absent evidence to the contrary, the common 
and the commercial meaning are presumed to be the same.43 In 
making this determination, the judge may rely upon his or her 
own understanding of the words, so-called lexicographical 
sources, and expert testimony.44 
With respect to the development of a factual record, the par-
ties may engage in detailed discovery concerning the physical 
nature of the merchandise. Often, this involves responding to 
numerous interrogatories and producing corporate records con-
cerning the design, production, marketing, and use of the prod-
uct as well as depositions of both fact and expert witnesses. 
There are no reliable statistics available concerning discovery 
practices at the Court of International Trade. Nevertheless, the 
nature of these cases is that the plaintiff, which is usually the 
importer, holds all of the knowledge and expertise concerning 
the nature of the imported product. The defendant, which is 
the United States Government, must use the mandatory disclo-
sure information and discovery tools to learn about the product. 
At the same time, the plaintiff may engage in discovery to de-
termine, to the extent that it is documented, the government’s 
decision making process and analysis. As would be expected in 
a case that might turn on the resolution of disputed facts, both 
parties use discovery tools to look for inconsistencies in testi-
mony, probe credibility, create evidentiary foundations, and to 
find facts that, based on their understanding of the relevant 
tariff terms, support their desired outcome. In other words, the 
parties engage in potentially expensive and time-consuming 
discovery as would careful lawyers in most federal litigation. 
But, unlike most other kinds of litigation, much of that time 
                                                                                                             
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012). 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
 42. Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Baxter Healthcare v. United States, 22 C.I.T. 82, 88-89 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1998) (citation omitted) aff’d, 182 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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and effort is often wasted because the court’s interpretation of 
the controlling statute—the HTSUS—decides or substantially 
focuses the dispute as a matter of law. 
IV. CLASSIFICATION CASE STUDIES 
The following cases are presented to illustrate the principles 
discussed in this paper and as examples for practitioners to 
consider whether the Markman model would present a means 
of achieving a faster resolution of the case. 
A. Firstrax v. United States 
This case45 involved the tariff classification of collapsible pet 
crates made of a steel frame and textile covering.46 Upon liqui-
dation of the entries, Customs determined that the correct tar-
iff classification for the crates was in Heading 4202,47 which 
provides for: 
Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, attaché cases, briefcases, 
school satchels, spectacle cases, binocular cases, camera cas-
es, musical instrument cases, gun cases, holsters and similar 
containers; traveling bags, insulated food or beverage bags, 
toiletry bags, knapsacks and backpacks, handbags, shopping 
bags, wallets, purses, map cases, cigarette cases, tobacco 
pouches, tool bags, sports bags, bottle cases, jewelry boxes, 
powder cases, cutlery cases and similar containers, of leather 
or of composition leather, of sheeting of plastics, of textile ma-
terials, of vulcanized fiber or of paperboard, or wholly or 
mainly covered with such materials or with paper. . . 
Classification in this heading, specifically in tariff item 
4202.92.90, resulted in an applicable rate of duty of 17.6%.48 
For its part, the plaintiff believed the correct classification to 
be as an “other made up article” of textiles, classifiable in tariff 
item 6307.90.98, which carries a rate of duty of 7%.49 
In other cases, the Court of International Trade and Federal 
Circuit had held that products properly classifiable in Heading 
4202 are designed to protect, organize, store, and transport 
                                                                                                             
 45. Firstrax v. United States, No. 07-00097, 2011 WL 5024271 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade Oct. 21, 2011). 
 46. Id. at *1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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personal property of some kind.50 As a result, the discovery 
process focused on the factual questions of whether the pet 
crates were designed, marketed, and used to organize, store, 
protect and transport pets, primarily dogs. 
B. Del Monte Corp. v. United States 
Del Monte Corp. imported prepackaged tuna meat prepared 
with the addition of a flavored sauce in an airtight pouch.51 The 
sauce contained a small amount of oil, which was intended to 
function as a flavor dispersant or emulsifier. The amount of the 
oil was between 0.62% and 2.48% by weight of the contents.52 
According to counsel for the importer, the predominant addi-
tive to the tuna was water.53 The question before the court was 
whether the tuna was classifiable as tuna in airtight containers 
“[n]ot in oil.”54 
Practitioners familiar with customs litigation can imagine 
the scope and nature of discovery involved in this case. It is 
likely that Del Monte personnel provided detailed factual in-
formation concerning the formulation and function of the sauce 
mixture. There may also have been significant time spent with 
both lay and expert witnesses explaining the function per-
formed by the small amount of oil in the mixture. Nevertheless, 
the case turned on the question of whether there is a de mini-
mis amount of oil permissible in tuna “[n]ot in oil.” 
C. Salem Minerals v. United States 
The last case for illustration involves the importation of deco-
rative glass vials containing small amounts of gold leaf in a 
liquid suspension.55 These items were sold to tourists in gold 
producing regions and were not considered to be items of jewel-
ry or fine goods.56 The importer wanted to have the goods clas-
                                                                                                             
 50. Avenues in Leather, Inc. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1399, 1401 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
 51. Del Monte Corp. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2012). 
 52. Id. at 1317. 
 53. Id. at 1318. 
 54. Id. at 1319. 
 55. Salem Minerals, Inc. v. United States, No. 07-00227, 2012 WL 
2700424, at *1 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 26, 2012). 
 56. Id. at *2. 
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sified as other articles of precious metals.57 Customs classified 
the goods as articles of goldsmith’s wares.58 Thus, the sole 
question presented to the court to resolve the case was the 
meaning of the term “goldsmith’s wares.” There appears to 
have been no material dispute as to the nature of the product 
or its production. Nevertheless, there seems to have been sig-
nificant inquiry into the facts surrounding the production pro-
cess involved in making the gold leaf as well as the vial and 
decorative cap. 
V. APPLYING THE MARKMAN MODEL TO CLASSIFICATION CASES 
Practitioners who adopt an approach similar to that under-
taken in patent cases in the wake of Markman may reduce the 
scope of discovery undertaken in customs classification cases 
and improve the efficiency of deciding these issues. If, for ex-
ample, either party in a classification case identifies a control-
ling question of tariff interpretation, that question can be pre-
sented to the court early as a motion for partial summary 
judgment under CIT Rule 56.59 A prompt decision by the court 
on the scope of the tariff heading might sufficiently clarify the 
controlling law to permit a stipulated judgment, settlement, or 
voluntary dismissal of the action. Even if the legal determina-
tion is not dispositive as to the entire case, at least counsel, 
who knows the scope of the tariff headings involved, can then 
tailor discovery accordingly. 
For example, in the Firstrax case, the main question to be de-
cided was the scope of HTSUS Heading 4202. Specifically, 
whether the collapsible pet crates were similar to the exem-
plars of, among other things, traveling bags, knapsacks and 
backpacks, tool bags, and sports bags. Plaintiff’s argument was 
based partly on the premise that none of the containers used as 
exemplars in Heading 4202 are used to contain a living ani-
mal.60 As a result, the pet crates were not “similar to” the items 
included in Heading 4202 and were therefore excluded from 
4202 classification.61 This is a question that could have been 
put to the Court of International Trade prior to either party 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. at *1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 56(a) (2013). 
 60. Firstrax,  2011 WL 5024271, at *1. 
 61. Id. at *7. 
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conducting any discovery. Further, had the court agreed, it is 
entirely possible that the case would have settled because of 
the lack of an alternative classification. Had the court disa-
greed, the parties could then have proceeded to discovery on 
whether the pet crates were able to protect, organize, store, 
and transport pets. 
Del Monte turned on the meaning of the tariff term “[n]ot in 
oil.” Thus, given a product that unquestionably contains a 
small amount of oil in the closed pouch, the possibly dispositive 
question was whether there existed a de minimis amount of oil. 
The court eventually held that 0.62% by weight of oil was a suf-
ficient amount for the tuna to be considered packed “in oil.”62 
Had the parties asked the court whether that level of oil in the 
sauce mixture would be sufficient to make the tuna classifiable 
as “in oil,” that determination may have resolved the case. Or, 
the parties may have wanted a decision on additional legal 
questions such as whether the oil needed to act as a flavoring 
or preservative agent. 
Finally, in Salem Minerals, had the parties asked the court to 
define “goldsmith’s wares” prior to the commencement of dis-
covery, the parties may have avoided significant time and ex-
pense. In particular, the parties might have resolved the mat-
ter had they known at the start of the case that the court would 
find goldsmith’s wares to be limited to useful articles formed of 
gold for household, office, or religious use—including jewelry.63 
This definition excluded the gold leaf from the meaning of gold-
smith’s wares, as leaf is a semi-manufactured form of gold, not 
an article of gold.64 Furthermore, the court’s definition excluded 
objects plated in gold, including the stoppers in the vials.65 
Without regard to any factual disputes to be resolved in discov-
ery, the definition of the term “goldsmith’s wares” may have 
resolved this case or substantially facilitated an early resolu-
tion. 
VI. POSSIBLE CONCERNS 
For practitioners, the application of Markman-style proce-
dures to tariff classification litigation may appear to present 
                                                                                                             
 62. Del Monte Corp., 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1320. 
 63. Salem Minerals, Inc., 2012 WL 2700424, at *7. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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practical problems and raise questions for both the private liti-
gant and the U.S. Department of Justice. The most obvious 
question is whether this approach might result in the conclu-
sion of litigation in the absence of a full record made before the 
court. The short answer to that concern is that it is intended to 
result in cases being decided before a full record is developed 
with respect to the facts involved. This approach is based on 
practical experience in customs litigation as well as the obser-
vation that the Court of International Trade holds very few tri-
als in the course of any given year. Rather, the court resolves 
almost all classification disputes on motions for summary 
judgment. This is an acknowledgement that these cases turn 
on legal interpretations rather than factual disputes and that 
discovery that is often considered necessary by a prudent law-
yer may not be necessary or particularly useful in classification 
cases. 
More important, a party seeking an early determination as to 
the meaning of relevant tariff terms has few limitations on 
what can be submitted to the court. The court has repeatedly 
noted that to determine the common and commercial meaning 
of an undefined tariff term, it may consult dictionaries, scien-
tific authorities, and other reliable information sources includ-
ing “lexicographic and other materials.”66 The court may also 
rely on its own understanding of the term used.67 Lastly, the 
court may consider expert opinions regarding the common 
meaning or understanding of a term in a particular industry or 
context. These expert opinions are advisory in nature, and the 
court will give them weight only to the extent they are con-
sistent with lexicographic and other reliable sources.68 
What this means is that the parties to a classification case 
who opt to seek an early resolution of a classification matter 
may present to the court fully formed arguments concerning 
the legal issues. These arguments can be based on standard 
and technical dictionaries, expert opinions, and lexicographical 
sources. While it is true that much discovery in tariff litigation 
is directed at cataloging particular examples of use by the par-
ties and the relevant industry, individual examples of usage by 
                                                                                                             
 66. See, e.g., Simod America Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572, 1576 
(Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 67. See, e.g., Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1291 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 68. Samsung, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. 
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the importer or Customs personnel are of limited value in iden-
tifying the common, English meaning of a term. Furthermore, 
those examples of usage could easily be included in early, man-
datory disclosures to the opposing party. Consequently, it does 
not appear that adopting a Markman style approach to resolv-
ing questions of law in tariff litigation will produce decisions on 
the question of law that were based on an undeveloped record. 
A second area of concern might be the appealability of the 
isolated legal determination as to the meaning of the tariff 
term. Given that the majority of tariff classification decisions 
appealed from the Court of International Trade are currently 
taken from decisions on motions for summary judgment, this 
does not appear to present a problem. The party that disagrees 
with the decision rendered on the legal question would, pre-
sumably, not agree to an early settlement or stipulation. As a 
result, the case would continue until such time as either party 
believed it had sufficient grounds to move for complete sum-
mary judgment. Assuming a decision on the merits, the case 
would not be different than any other summary judgment deci-
sion. Should the Court of Appeals reverse the Court of Interna-
tional Trade’s legal interpretation, the case would be remanded 
for further proceedings. Given the change in legal interpreta-
tion necessitated by a reversal, additional discovery may be re-
quired in order to determine how the court should interpret the 
tariff language. The Court of International Trade would need to 
permit that discovery to occur. Given the similarity of this pro-
cess to patent litigation, it is likely that the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit will be comfortable with this type of bi-
furcated process. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Counsel in customs classification cases should realistically 
review their cases and make an early determination as to the 
real, controlling questions. It is possible that there may be sig-
nificant disputes as to material facts that will prevent a case 
from being decided on the basis of a motion for summary judg-
ment. Those cases are, however, in the minority. 
In the more usual circumstance, the case turns on a question 
of law based on the interpretation of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule. In these cases, practitioners should seek to engage 
the court early to receive a definitive ruling as to the meaning 
of the disputed tariff language. That step will either promote 
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the resolution of the case through voluntary dismissal or stipu-
lated judgment, or it will focus the parties on discovery rele-
vant to the tariff term’s legal meaning. 
The most obvious means of implementing this approach is a 
motion on the initiative of one or both parties through the Rule 
56(a) partial summary judgment process.69 Another possibility 
is for the assigned judge or a party to request that the classifi-
cation be referred to Court-Annexed Mediation pursuant to CIT 
Rule 16.1.70 In mediation, a judge of the Court of International 
Trade could provide an expert and impartial view as to the 
meaning and scope of the tariff language. This might encourage 
the parties to more realistically evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of their cases and, as discussed above, might limit 
and focus discovery to the relevant physical characteristics of 
the merchandise. 
If, however, litigants do not approach the tariff litigation us-
ing these tools and the court sees value in this approach, the 
court is not without recourse. Under Rule 16.1, a judge can re-
fer the action to mediation.71 Or, if the Court of International 
Trade chooses, it can follow the lead of district courts that have 
promulgated local rules to implement the Markman process. 
Specifically, if necessary or desirable, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade could consider adopting rules similar to local pa-
tent rules under which the parties would be required to consult 
and present to the court a list of tariff terms to be construed. 
Each party would then be permitted to submit briefs support-
ing their respective constructions of the disputed tariff terms. 
Those briefs would contain any available evidence of common 
and commercial meaning or commercial designation, including 
lexicographical materials and expert opinion. The parties 
would then be permitted to submit reply briefs, and, if deemed 
necessary, the court could hold an oral argument during which 
the experts could speak. 
CONCLUSION 
Customs litigation, as it is typically undertaken, looks very 
much like commercial litigation in any federal court. Practi-
tioners, who understandably do not know what information the 
                                                                                                             
 69. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 56(a) (2013). 
 70. 28 U.S.C.A. C.I.T. Rule 16.1 (2009). 
 71. Id. 
974 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
other side may have, often engage in multiple rounds of deposi-
tions, interrogatories, and requests for production. Much of 
that effort is directed at finding out the detailed specifications 
of the imported product, which is not realistically in dispute. 
Furthermore, both sides use discovery to explore and catalog 
the language individuals and companies use in relation to the 
product. This is also of minimal probative impact when trying 
to determine the common meaning of a term in the English 
language, as opposed to that term’s common meaning within a 
particular company or in the parlance of a handful of individu-
als. 
More often than not, there is no smoking gun in corporate file 
drawers. There is rarely a “Gotcha!” moment when the presi-
dent of the importer testifying in a deposition changes her 
statement as to the meaning of a term. Moreover, on an occa-
sion when that happens, the impact of the evidence is of limited 
value when weighed against dictionaries, technical references, 
and expert opinion. Consequently, there is significant lawyer-
ing invested in fact-based discovery, the related questions of 
evidence law, and linguistic hunts for needles in the haystacks 
of business records. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is familiar with 
Markman and has experience reviewing the decisions of the 
district courts where there have been bifurcated proceedings to 
resolve questions of law and fact. As a result, adopting a simi-
lar approach to customs litigation should not present any ana-
lytical problems for the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, the 
Court of International Trade bases most of its tariff classifica-
tion decisions exclusively on questions of law, without regard to 
disputed material facts. Thus, the process for appealing a bi-
furcated classification case will present no procedural or ad-
ministrative difficulties for the parties or either court. 
Reversing the current process of tariff litigation by resolving 
questions of law early in the process will likely result in signifi-
cantly more efficient resolutions of these matters. An early ju-
dicial decision as to the scope of tariff language will, at a mini-
mum, focus discovery on the relevant questions. In many cases, 
a decision as to what the disputed language means may result 
in the complete resolution of the case without the need for any 
discovery. Thus, this suggested process, which can be under-
taken by practitioners without a change in the court’s rules, 
will benefit the parties, the court, and the public. 
